Within the context of extensive-form (or dynamic) games, we use choice frames to represent the initial beliefs of a player as well as her disposition to change those beliefs when she learns that an information set of hers has been reached. As shown in [5] , in order for the revision operation to be consistent with the AGM postulates [1], the player's choice frame must be rationalizable in terms of a total pre-order on the set of histories. We consider four properties of choice frames and show that, together with the hypothesis of a common prior, are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a plausibility order that rationalizes the epistemic state (that is, initial beliefs and disposition to revise those beliefs) of all the players. The plausibility order satisfies the properties introduced in [6] as part of a new definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for dynamic games. Thus the present paper provides epistemic foundations for that solution concept.
INTRODUCTION
In a dynamic (or extensive-form) game, a player might find herself having to move at an information set that -according to her prior beliefs -should not have been reached. * An extended version of this paper is available as Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: epistemic foundations, at http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/bonanno/wpapers.htm.
ACM COPYRIGHT NOTICE. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Publications Dept., ACM, Inc., fax +1 (212) 869-0481, or permissions@acm.org. In such a case the player will have to revise her prior beliefs by formulating a hypothesis about the past moves of other players and a prediction about future moves by herself and the other players. How players revise their beliefs during the play of a game is of central importance in any attempt to provide a solution concept for dynamic games. In [6] we introduced a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which can be applied to arbitrary extensiveform games and is intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium.
1 In this paper we provide an epistemic foundation of perfect Bayesian equilibrium based on the AGM theory of belief revision proposed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1] . We use choice frames to represent the initial beliefs of a player as well as her disposition to change those beliefs when she learns that an information set of hers has been reached. As shown in [5] , in order for the revision operation to be consistent with the AGM postulates, the player's choice frame must be rationalizable in terms of a total pre-order on the set of histories. We consider four properties of choice frames that reflect the structure of extensive-form games and show that, together with the hypothesis of a common prior, are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a plausibility order that rationalizes the epistemic state (that is, initial beliefs and disposition to revise those beliefs) of all the players. The plausibility order satisfies the properties introduced in [6] as part of the definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
BELIEF REVISION IN GAMES
Choice frames can be used in dynamic or extensive-form games to represent, for every player, her initial beliefs as well as her disposition to change those beliefs when informed that it is her turn to move.
Definition 1. A choice frame is a triple Ω, E, f where
• Ω is a non-empty set of states. Subsets of Ω are called events.
• E ⊆ 2 Ω is a collection of events such that ∅ / ∈ E and Ω ∈ E.
• f : E → 2 Ω is a function that associates with every event E ∈ E an event f (E) satisfying the following properties: (1) f (E) ⊆ E and (2) f (E) = ∅.
H set of histories D set of decision histories Di set of decision histories of player i Ii(h) information set of player i that contains h ∈ Di A(h) set of actions available at h ∈ D ha history that results from adding to h action a ∈ A(h) ι (h) player who moves at history h ∈ D In rational choice theory a set E ∈ E is interpreted as a set of available alternatives and f (E) is interpreted as the subset of E which consists of the chosen alternatives (see, for example, [20] and [22] ).
2 In our case, we think of the elements of E as potential items of information and the interpretation of f (E) is that, if informed that event E has occurred, the agent considers as doxastically possible all and only the states in f (E). 3 The set f (Ω) is interpreted as the set of states that are initially considered doxastically possible (that is, before the receipt of information).
Note that in the rational choice literature it is common to impose some structure on the collection of events E (for example, that it be closed under finite unions or that it be an algebra: see [16, 20, 22] ). On the contrary, we allow E to be an arbitrary subset of 2 Ω and typically think of E as containing only a small number of events. This is characteristically the case in extensive-form games, as shown below.
We make use of the history-based definition of extensiveform game, which is reviewed in Appendix A. For simplicity, we restrict attention to games without chance moves. Table  1 summarizes the notation. For example, in the extensiveform shown in Figure 1 , the set of decision histories of player 4 is D4 = {acf, ade, adf, b} and player 4 has two information sets (represented by rounded rectangles): I4(acf ) = I4(ade) = {acf, ade} and I4(adf ) = I4(b) = {adf, b}.
Given an extensive form, we associate with every player i a choice frame Ω, Ei, fi as follows: Ω = H (recall that H denotes the set of histories), E ∈ Ei if and only if either E = H or E consists of an information set of player i together with all the continuation histories, as explained below. Recall that if h is a decision history of player i (h ∈ Di), player i's information set that contains h is denoted by Ii(h). We shall denote by − → Ii (h) the set Ii(h) together with the continuation histories: 4 2 Choice functions have also been used to provide a semantics for non-monotonic reasoning: see [16] 3 In order to avoid ambiguity, we use the expression 'doxastically possible' to distinguish between possibility in terms of information (or "objective" possibility) and possibility in terms of beliefs (or "subjective" possibility or "doxastic" possibility). Thus a state ω may be possible according to the information received (ω ∈ E) but may be ruled out by the agent's beliefs (ω / ∈ f (E)); the doxastically possible states -when informed that E -are precisely those in f (E). In a framework where beliefs are represented by a probability measure, a state is doxastically possible if and only if it is assigned positive probability. 4 We call − → Ii (h) the augmented information set of player i at decision history h ∈ Di. Because of the property of perfect recall (see Appendix A), for every player i ∈ N and for every
. That is, any two different augmented 
− →
For example, in the extensive form of Figure 1 ,
In the extensive form of Figure 1 , E4 = {H, E, F }, where E = {acf, ade, acf g, acf h, adeg, adeh} and F = {adf, b, adf m, adf n, bm, bn}.
Finally, the function fi provides initial beliefs as well as revised beliefs about past and future moves. For example, in the extensive form of Figure 1 possible beliefs for Player 4 are as follows: f4(H) = {a, ac, ace}, f4(E) = {acf, acf h} and f4(F ) = {b, bm}, where E and F are as given above. The interpretation of this is that Player 4 initially believes that Player 1 will play a, Player 2 will follow with c and Player 3 with e (so that Player 4 does not expect to be asked to make any choices; all this is encoded in f4(H)). If informed that she is at her information set on the left, Player 4 would continue to believe that Player 1 played a and Player 2 followed with c, but she would now believe that Player 3 chose f and she herself plans to choose h (this is encoded in f4(E)). On the other hand, if informed that she is at her information set on the right, Player 4 would believe that Player 1 played b and she herself plans to choose m (this is encoded in f4(F )).
We shall make the following natural assumptions about each player's beliefs. Let H, Ei, fi be the choice frame of player i representing the player's initial beliefs and disposition to change those beliefs. We assume that, for every E ∈ Ei and for every h, h ∈ H, information sets of the same player are either disjoint or one is a subset of the other. Thus if E, F ∈ Ei are such that
Hence, during any play of the game, player i never receives contradictory information; in fact if information F follows information E then F ⊆ E, that is, F is a refinement of E.
Assumption A1 says that the player's beliefs are closed under prefixes: if, when informed that event E has occurred, the player considers history h doxastically possible, and history h is a prefix of h (thus h is a necessary condition for h to be reached) then she also considers history h doxastically possible, as long as h is compatible with the information received (that is, as long as h ∈ E).
Assumption A2 says that if h is a decision history of player i (h ∈ Di), which she considers doxastically possible when informed that E (h ∈ fi(E)), then she also considers ha doxastically possible for some action a available at h. The interpretation of this is that the player has a belief, that is a plan, about how she would play at h. 5 Finally, Assumption A3 states that the player's beliefs about her own choices respect her information constraints, in the sense that if she considers histories h and ha doxastically possible (where h is a decision history of hers and a an action available at h) and h belongs to the same information set as h (h ∈ Ii(h)), then if she considers h doxastically possible then she must also consider h a doxastically possible. The reason for this is that -when taking action a -the player does not know whether she is taking that action at history h or at history h . Thus if she considers h and h doxastically possible then she can view ha as doxastically possible if and only if she views h a as doxastically possible.
Definition 2. The choice frame H, Ei, fi is rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order
The interpretation of h i h is that player i judges history h to be at least as plausible as h . Thus if her epistemic state is captured by a choice frame H, Ei, fi which is rationalizable, then -when she receives information E -player i considers a state doxastically possible if and only if that state is a most plausible state within the set E. An item of information E ∈ Ei lists all the histories that are still possible and fi(E) gives the histories that player i considers most plausible, given that information. Since, by definition of choice frame, H ∈ Ei, the set fi(H) gives player i's initial beliefs, that is, her beliefs before the game is played, while for E ∈ Ei\{H}, fi(E) gives player i's revised beliefs if informed that E has occurred.
It is shown in [5] that rationalizability of a choice frame is equivalent to compatibility of the associated belief revision 5 The view that "strategies as plans cannot be anything but beliefs of players about their own behavior" is also adopted in [3] . 6 A binary relation ⊆ H × H is a total pre-order if it is complete (∀h, h ∈ H either h h or h h) and transitive (∀h1, h2, h3 ∈ H if h1 h2 and h2 h3 then h1 h3). policy with the AGM postulates for belief revision [1] . 
For simplicity, we shall restrict attention to extensive forms that satisfy the following condition:
Condition C rules out situations where two consecutive actions are taken by the same player. Thus if, along a possible play of the game, a player takes several actions in a sequence then between any two of them there is an action taken by another -possibly fictitious -player.
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7 Because, typically, the set Ei of possible items of information contains only few elements, an interpretation of the frame yields only a partial belief revision function. "Compatibility with the AGM postulates"means that the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary interpretation of the frame can be extended to a full belief revision function that satisfies the AGM postulates (for details see [5] ). 8 Rationalizable choice frames provide a semantics for qualitative belief revision. A semantics for belief revision in terms of plausibility measures is provided in [9, 10] . 9 It should be noted that the AGM theory deals with 'onestage' belief revision, while in extensive-form games a player might receive information sequentially (when one of her information sets is preceded by another). Thus, in general, in extensive-form games one needs to consider what has been called in the literature 'iterated' belief revision. As noted in Footnote 4, because of the property of perfect recall, if a player receives two sequential pieces of information, E and F , then the latter is a refinement of the former (that is,
In all the theories of iterated belief revision that have been proposed (see, for instance [7, 8, 12, 17] ) it is postulated that when information E precedes information F and the latter is a refinement of the former, then the revised beliefs after the sequence E, F are the same as in the (possibly hypothetical) case where information F is received without it being preceded by E. Our analysis implicitly makes use of this assumption about iterated belief revision. 10 We say that action a ∈ A(h) is plausibility preserving at h if h is as plausible as ha, that is, if h ∼i ha, where h ∼i ha is a short-hand for h i ha and ha i h. 11 If an extensive form does not satisfy Condition C then one can transform it into one that does, by adding a fictitious player between two consecutive actions of the same player and assigning to the fictitious player only one action. Such a trasformation would be "inessential" in the sense that, for example, it would not affect the set of sequential equilibria. PL1.
Let { H, Ei, fi } i∈N be a profile of choice frames representing the initial beliefs and disposition to revise those beliefs of all the players. Let Pi be the set of total pre-orders that rationalize H, Ei, fi and satisfy Properties PL1 and PL2i (Proposition 1 above gives necessary and sufficient conditions for Pi = ∅).
Definition 3.
We say that the profile { H, Ei, fi } i∈N admits a common prior if T i∈N Pi = ∅, that is, if there exists a total pre-order on H that rationalizes the beliefs of all the players 12 and satisfies Properties PL1 and PL2i for every i ∈ N . We call any element of T i∈N Pi a common prior.
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If the players have a common prior then they share the same initial beliefs and the same disposition to change those beliefs in response to the same information. However, the existence of a common prior is consistent with the players holding different beliefs during any particular play of the game, since they will typically receive different information. A common prior can also be viewed as representing the initial beliefs and belief revision policy of an external observer (the external-observer point of view is pursued in [13] ).
Definition 4.
A total pre-order on the set of histories H is called a plausibility order if it satisfies the following properties: 
CHOICE FRAMES AND ASSESSMENTS
Solution concepts for extensive-form games that go beyond subgame-perfect equilibrium (such as sequential equilibrium) are defined in terms of assessments. The notion of assessment is reviewed in detail in Appendix A. An assessment is a pair (σ, μ) where σ is a (behavior) strategy profile (that is, an n-tuple of strategies, one for each player) and μ is a list of probability distributions, one for each information set, over the histories that constitute that information set. In [6] an assessment is defined to be AGM-consistent if there is a plausibility order (see Definition 4 above) that rationalizes (σ, μ) in the sense that the actions that are played with positive probability coincide with the plausibility-preserving actions and the histories that are assigned positive probability are those that are most plausible within each information set. The formal definition is as follows (where σ(a) denotes the probability with which action a is chosen according to σ and μ(h) is the probability assigned to history h by the relevant part of μ). Let { H, Ei, fi } i∈N be a profile of choice frames such that (i) the choice frame of each player satisfies Arrow's Axiom and Assumptions (A1)-(A3) and (2) the profile { H, Ei, fi } i∈N admits a common prior. Let be any common prior. By Proposition 2, is a plausibility order. Corresponding to there will be many AGM-consistent assessments (σ, μ), all of which share the same support (for σ the support is given by the plausibility-preserving actions and for μ the support is given by the most plausible histories within each information set).
14 It can be shown that the converse is also true, that is, given an AGM-consistent assessment (σ, μ) one can extract from it a profile { H, Ei, fi } i∈N of choice frames that satisfies the hypothesis of Proposition 2. Thus the analysis of this paper provides a foundation for the notion of AGMconsistent assessment in terms of epistemic states for the players that satisfy the AGM postulates for belief revision.
CONCLUSION
As shown in [6] , the qualitative notion of AGM-consistency of assessments (Definition 5) is a generalization of the notion of consistency proposed by Kreps and Wilson [15] as part of the definition of sequential equilibrium. The conceptual content of the notion of Kreps-Wilson consistency is not clear and several attempts have been made to clarify it by relating it to more intuitive notions, such as 'structural consistency' ( [14] ), 'generally reasonable extended assessment' ( [11] ), 'stochastic independence' ( [2, 13] ). 15 In this paper we introduced a representation of the epistemic state of players in dynamic games based on of choice frames, which provide a link to the AGM theory of belief revision [1, 5] . We have identified four properties of individual frames that, together with the hypothesis of a common prior, are equivalent to the existence of an AGM-consistent assessment. 14 The definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium put forward in [6] specifies a way in which the probabilities can be chosen on these supports so as to make μ compatible with σ and Bayes' rule. 15 Perea et al [19] offer an algebraic characterization of consistent assessments.
APPENDIX A. EXTENSIVE FORMS AND ASSESSMENTS
In this appendix we review the history-based definition of extensive-form game (see, for example, [18] A finite extensive form without chance moves is a tuplė A, H, N, ι, {≈i} i∈N¸w hose elements are:
• A finite set of actions A.
• A finite set of histories H ⊆ A * which is closed under prefixes (that is, if h ∈ H and h ∈ A * is a prefix of h, then h ∈ H). The null history , denoted by ∅, is an element of H and is a prefix of every history. A history h ∈ H such that, for every a ∈ A, ha / ∈ H, is called a terminal history. The set of terminal histories is denoted by Z. Let D = H \ Z denote the set of nonterminal or decision histories. For every history h ∈ H, we denote by A(h) the set of actions available at h, that is, A(h) = {a ∈ A : ha ∈ H}. Thus A(h) = ∅ if and only if h ∈ D. We assume that A = S h∈D A(h) (that is, we restrict attention to actions that are available at some decision history).
• A finite set N = {1, ..., n} of players.
• A function ι : D → N that assigns a player to each decision history; thus ι(h) is the player who moves at history h. For every i ∈ N , let Di = ι −1 (i) be the histories assigned to player i. Thus {D1, ..., Dn} is a partition of D.
• For every player i ∈ N , ≈i is an equivalence relation on Di. The interpretation of h ≈i h is that, when choosing an action at history h ∈ Di, player i does not know whether she is moving at h or at h . The equivalence class of h ∈ Di is denoted by Ii(h) and is called an information set of player i; thus Ii(h) = {h ∈ Di : h ≈i h }. The following restriction applies:
, that is, the set of actions available to a player is the same at any two histories that belong to the same information set of that player.
• The following property, known as perfect recall, is assumed: for every player i ∈ N , if h1, h2 ∈ Di, a ∈ A(h1) and h1a is a prefix of h2 then for every h ∈ Ii(h2) there exists an h ∈ Ii(h1) such that ha is a prefix of h . Intuitively, perfect recall requires a player to remember what she knew in the past and what actions she took previously (see [4] ).
In order to simplify the notation in the proofs, we shall assume that no action is available at more than one information set:
Given an extensive form, one obtains a game based on it by adding, for every player i ∈ N , a utility (or payoff) function 16 In particular, every history is a prefix of itself.
Ui : Z → R (where R denotes the set of real numbers; recall that Z is the set of terminal histories).
Given an extensive form, a pure strategy of player i ∈ N is a function that associates with every information set of player i an action at that information set, that is, a function si : Di → A such that (1
) si(h) ∈ A(h) and (2) if h ∈ Ii(h) then si(h ) = si(h).
A behavior strategy of player i is a collection of probability distributions, one for each information set, over the actions available at that information set; that is, a function σi : Di → Δ(A) (where Δ(A) denotes the set of probability distributions over A) such that (1) σi(h) is a probability distribution over A(h) and (2) if h ∈ Ii(h) then σi(h ) = σi(h). Note that a pure strategy is a special case of a behavior strategy where each probability distribution is degenerate. A behavior-strategy profile is an n-tuple σ = (σ1, ..., σn) where, for every i ∈ N , σi is a behavior strategy of player i. Given our assumption that no action is available at more than one information set, without risking ambiguity we shall denote by σ(a) the probability assigned to action a by the relevant component of the strategy profile σ.
A system of beliefs, is a collection of probability distributions, one for every information set, over the elements of that information set, that is, a function μ : D → Δ(H) such that (1) if h ∈ Di then μ(h) is a probability distribution over Ii(h) and (2) if h ∈ Di and h ∈ Ii(h) then μ(h) = μ(h ). Without risking ambiguity we shall denote by μ(h) the probability assigned to history h by the system of beliefs μ. 17 An assessment is a pair (σ, μ) where σ is a behaviorstrategy profile and μ is a system of beliefs.
B. PROOFS
The proof of Proposition 1 requires several preliminary results. The idea of the proof is to construct a binary relation on the set of histories H that satisfies Properties PL1 and PL2i and extend it to a total pre-order which is then shown to rationalize the given choice frame. The extension is obtained by invoking Proposition 3 below, which is known as Szpilrajn's theorem (for a proof see [22] , p. 14). First we give the definition of extension. Given a binary relation R on H (thus R ⊆ H × H) we shall interchangeably use the notation hRh and (h, h ) ∈ R. Definition 6. Let R be a binary relation on H and a total pre-order on H. We say that extends R if (1) 
Proposition 3. (Szpilrajn's theorem) Let R be a binary relation on H which is reflexive and transitive. Then there exists a total pre-order on H which extends R.
The following proposition is more general than Proposition 1 in that it applies to arbitrary extensive forms (that is, Condition C is not assumed), but it is also weaker since it only refers to Property PL1 and Assumption A1. The proof illustrates the strategy used in proving Proposition 1. Proof. (a) ⇒ (b) . Let be a total pre-order on H that satisfies property PL1 and is such that
A more precise notation would be μ(h)(h): if h ∈ Di then μ(h) is a probability distribution over Ii(h) and, for every h ∈ I(h), μ(h) = μ(h ) so that μ(h)(h) = μ(h )(h). With slight abuse of notation we denote this common probability by μ(h).
(1)
First we show that Arrow's Axiom (AA) holds. Let F, G ∈ Ei be such that
Hence, by (1) and the fact that h ∈ F , h ∈ fi(F ). Conversely, fix an arbitrary h ∈ fi(F ). Then, by (1),
By hypothesis,
Next we prove that Assumption A1 is satisfied. Fix arbitrary E ∈ Ei and h ∈ fi(E). Let h ∈ E be a prefix of h. We need to show that h ∈ fi(E). By (1) (since h ∈ fi(E)), h
y, ∀y ∈ E. By Property PL1 and transitivity of , h h. 18 Thus, by transitivity of , h y, ∀y ∈ E, so that, by (1), h ∈ fi(E).
(b) ⇒ (a). Let H, Ei, fi satisfy Arrow's Axiom and Assumption A1. Define the following binary relation S on H:
h is a prefix of h1, h1 ∈ fi(E) and h ∈ E.
(3) First we show that S is reflexive and transitive. Reflexivity follows from (a) of (3) and the fact that, by definition of prefix, every history is a prefix of itself. To prove transitivity, fix arbitrary h, h , h ∈ H and suppose that hSh and h Sh . We need to show that hSh . If h is a prefix of h and h is a prefix of h , then h is a prefix of h and thus hSh . If h is a prefix of h while h is not a prefix of h , then ∃h1 ∈ H, ∃E ∈ Ei such that h is a prefix of h1, h1 ∈ fi(E) and h ∈ E. Then (since h is a prefix of h and h is a prefix of h1) h is a prefix of h1 and thus hSh by (b) of (3). If h is not a prefix of h while h is a prefix of h , then ∃h1 ∈ H, ∃E ∈ Ei such that h is a prefix of h1, h1 ∈ fi(E) and h ∈ E. Then, since h ∈ E and h is a prefix of h , h ∈ E (this follows from the definition of Ei). Thus hSh by (b) of (3). We are left with the case where h is not a prefix of h and h is not a prefix of h . Then ∃x1, y1 ∈ H, Footnote 4) . Consider first the case where F ⊆ E. Then, since h ∈ F , we have that h ∈ E. By (b) of (3), it follows from this, (i) and (ii) that hSh . Now consider the case where E ⊆ F . Since y1 ∈ fi(F ) and y1 ∈ E, fi(F ) ∩ E = ∅. Thus, by Arrow's Axiom, fi(E) = fi(F ) ∩ E. Hence, since x1 ∈ fi(E), x1 ∈ fi(F ). Thus, since since h is a prefix of x1, x1 ∈ fi(F ) and h ∈ F , by (b) of (3) hSh .
Since S is reflexive and transitive, by Proposition 3, there exists a total pre-order on H which extends S (see Definition 6). Fix an arbitrary such total pre-order . We want to show that satisfies Property PL1 and rationalizes H, Ei, fi . Since, for every h ∈ D and a ∈ A(h), h is a prefix of ha, (h, ha) ∈ S and thus, since S is a subset of , h ha so that satisfies Property PL1. Now fix an arbitrary E ∈ Ei. We need to show that fi(E) = {h ∈ E : h h , ∀h ∈ E}. Fix arbitrary h ∈ fi(E) and h ∈ E. Then (since h is a prefix of itself) by (b) of (3) hSh and thus, since S is a subset of , h h . Hence fi(E) ⊆ {h ∈ E : h h , ∀h ∈ E}. For the converse, let h ∈ E be such that h h for all h ∈ E; we need to show that h ∈ fi(E). Fix an arbitrary h0 ∈ fi(E) (recall that, by definition of choice frame, fi(E) = ∅). If h is a prefix of h0 then, by Assumption A1, h ∈ fi(E). Suppose that h is not a prefix of h0. By definition of S (since h ∈ E and h0 ∈ fi(E) and h0 is a prefix of itself), (h0, h) ∈ S. If (h, h0) / ∈ S, then, since is an extension of S (see Definition 6), (h, h0) / ∈ , contradicting our hypothesis that h h , ∀h ∈ E. Thus it must be that (h, h0) ∈ S. Then (since h is not a prefix of h0) there exist h1 ∈ H and F ∈ Ei such that (i) h is a prefix of h1, (ii) h1 ∈ fi(F ) and (iii) h0 ∈ F . Then (since h0 ∈ F and h0 ∈ fi(E) ⊆ E), E ∩ F = ∅ and thus (see Footnote 4) either E ⊆ F or F ⊆ E (see Footnote 4). Suppose first that E ⊆ F . Since h ∈ E and h is a prefix of h1, h1 ∈ E. Thus, since h1 ∈ fi(F ), fi(F ) ∩ E = ∅ and, by Arrow's Axiom, fi(E) = fi(F ) ∩ E. Hence h1 ∈ fi(E) and thus, by Assumption A1 (since h is a prefix of h1 and
and therefore, by Assumption A1 (since h is a prefix of h1), h ∈ fi(E).
The proof of Proposition 1 follows the same strategy, starting from a relation that satisfies also Property PL2i. In order to do this we need several preliminary lemmas. Note that Condition C is used only in the proof of Lemma 3 and is not needed for any other result.
Lemma 1. Fix an arbitrary choice frame H, Ei, fi of player i. Let h ∈ Di be a decision history of player i and let F ∈ Ei
Proof. Since h ∈ F ∈ Ei, there exists an x ∈ Di such that x is a prefix of h and
Fix an arbitrary choice frame H, Ei, fi of player i. Define the following binary relations on H:
(x, y) ∈ R2 if and only if
y ∈ Di, x = ya for some a ∈ A(y) and ∃h ∈ Ii(y) such that h, ha ∈ fi(E) where
(x, y) ∈ R3 if and only if x ∈ fi(H) and y is a prefix of x.
(x, y) ∈ R4 if and only if j y ∈ D i, y is a prefix of x and
(x, y) ∈ R5 if and only if x is a prefix of y.
R * = transitive closure of R. (9) ). Then, ∀j = 1, ..., m, ∃hj ∈ Ii(h) such that hja is a prefix of xj.
Proof. This is clearly true for j = 1 (take h1 = h). We now show that if the statement is true for j ≥ 1 then it is true for j + 1. Let hj ∈ H be such that
hj ∈ Ii(h) and hja is a prefix of xj.
By hypothesis, (x j , xj+1) ∈ R. We need to consider all the possible cases. Case 1: (xj, xj+1) ∈ R5. Then xj is a prefix of xj+1 and thus, since hja is a prefix of xj, hja is a prefix of xj+1.
Case 2: (xj, xj+1) ∈ R4. Then xj+1 ∈ Di, xj+1 is a prefix of xj and
Since both hja and xj+1 are prefixes of xj, either hja is a prefix of xj+1 (with xj+1 = hja as a special case), and thus the claim is true (take hj+1 = hj), or xj+1 is a prefix of hja and xj+1 = hja. Consider the latter case; then xj+1 is a prefix of h j . Let E = − → Ii (h) = − → Ii (hj). Then, by perfect recall (since xj+1 ∈ Di), E ⊆ F . Thus, since, by (11) and (12), xj ∈ fi(F ) ∩ E, by Arrow's Axiom fi(E) = fi(F ) ∩ E so that xj ∈ fi(E). Hence, by Assumption A1, since hja is a prefix of xj, hja ∈ fi(E) and thus also hj ∈ fi(E); but this implies, by definition of R2 (see (5)), that (ha, h) ∈ R2, contrary to our hypothesis. Thus if (xj, xj+1) ∈ R4 then hja is a prefix of xj+1.
Case 3: we show that it cannot be that (xj, xj+1) ∈ R3. In fact, (xj, xj+1) ∈ R3 requires that xj ∈ fi(H) so that, by Arrow's Axiom, fi(E) = fi(H) ∩ E (where E = − → Ii (h); note that xj ∈ E). Hence xj ∈ fi(E) and, by Assumption A1 (since hja is a prefix of xj), hja ∈ fi(E) an thus also hj ∈ fi(E); but this implies, by definition of R2, that (ha, h) ∈ R2, contrary to our hypothesis.
Case 4: (xj, xj+1) ∈ R2. Then, by definition of R2, either
, it would follow that (ha, h) ∈ R2, contradicting our hypothesis. In case (ii) hja is a prefix of xj+1.
Case 5: (xj, xj+1) ∈ R1. Then xj ∈ Di and xj+1 ∈ Ii(xj). By perfect recall, since hja is a prefix of xj, ∃h ∈ Ii(hj) = Ii(h) such that h a is a prefix of xj+1. 
To prove the converse, suppose that (ha, h) ∈ R * . Then there exists a sequence x1, ..., xm (m ≥ 2) in H such that x1 = ha, xm = h and, ∀j = 1, ..., m − 1, (xj, xj+1) ∈ R. If (ha, h) / ∈ R2 then, by Lemma 2, ∀j = 1, ..., m, ∃hj ∈ Ii(h) such that hja is prefix of xj. In particular, ∃hm ∈ Ii(h) such that hma is prefix of xm = h, but this violates perfect recall.
Lemma 3. Fix an extensive form that satisfies Condition C. Let H, Ei, fi be a choice frame of player i that satisfies Arrow's Axiom and Assumptions A1 and A3. Let F ∈ Ei and x, y ∈ H be such that x ∈ fi(F ) and y ∈ F \fi(F ). Then (x, y) ∈ R * and (y, x) / ∈ R * (where R * is given by (10) ).
Proof. First we show that (x, y) ∈ R * . If F = H then x ∈ fi(H). Let ∅ denote the empty history (recall ∅ is a prefix of every history). Then (x, ∅) ∈ R3 and (∅, y) ∈ R5. Thus (x, y) ∈ R * . Consider now the case where F = H. Then (since x, y ∈ F ) there exist x0, y0 ∈ Di such that F = − → Ii (x0), y0 ∈ Ii(x0), x0 is a prefix of x and y0 is a prefix of y. Since x ∈ fi(F ), (x, x0) ∈ R4 (13) and, by Assumption A1, x0 ∈ fi(F ). Thus
Hence, since (y0, y) ∈ R5, it follows from (13) and (14) that (x, y) ∈ R * .
Next we show that (y, x) / ∈ R * . We will show that if x1, ..., xm (m ≥ 2) is a sequence in H with x1 ∈ F \fi(F ) for some F ∈ Ei, and, for all j = 1, ..., m − 1, (xj, xj+1) ∈ R (where R is defined in (9)) then xm / ∈ fi(F ). For this purpose it will be sufficient to prove the following: ∀F ∈ Ei, ∀h1, h2 ∈ H if h 1 ∈ F \fi(F ) and (h1, h2) ∈ R then h2 ∈ F \fi(F ). (15) Let F ∈ Ei, h1 ∈ F \fi(F ) and (h1, h2) ∈ R. We need to consider all the possible cases.
Suppose that (h1, h2) ∈ R1. Then h1 ∈ Di, h2 ∈ Ii(h1) and h1 ∈ fi(E) where E = − → Ii (h1). Since h1 ∈ F , by Lemma 1 F ⊇ E. Thus, since h2 ∈ E, h2 ∈ F . Suppose that h2 ∈ fi(F ). Then h2 ∈ fi(F ) ∩ E and thus, by Arrow's Axiom, fi(E) = fi(F )∩E, so that h1 ∈ fi(F ), contradicting our hypothesis. Hence h2 ∈ F \fi(F ).
Suppose that (h1, h2) ∈ R2. Then h2 ∈ Di and h1 = h2a for some a ∈ A(h2) and
. By Condition C (since h2 ∈ Di), h2a / ∈ Di and thus x is a prefix of h2, so that F ⊇ E. 20 Thus h2 ∈ F . If h2 ∈ fi(F ) then fi(F ) ∩ E = ∅ and thus, by Arrow's Axiom, fi(E) = fi(F ) ∩ E, so that h2 ∈ fi(E). It follows from this, (16) and Assumption A3 that h2a ∈ fi(E) and thus h2a ∈ fi(F ), contradicting the hypothesis that h2a = h1 ∈ F \fi(F ). Hence h2 ∈ F \fi(F ).
Next we show that (h1, h2) / ∈ R3. If (h1, h3) ∈ R3 then h1 ∈ fi(H) and thus (since h1 ∈ F ) fi(H) ∩ F = ∅ and by Arrow's Axiom fi(F ) = fi(H) ∩ F so that h1 ∈ fi(F ), contradicting the hypothesis that h1 ∈ F \fi(F ).
Suppose that (h1, h2) ∈ R4. Then h2 ∈ Di, h2 is a prefix of h1 and h1 ∈ fi(E) where E = − → Ii (h2). Since h1 ∈ E ∩ F , E ∩ F = ∅ and thus (see Footnote 4) either E ⊆ F or F ⊆ E. It cannot be that F ⊆ E because in this case (since h1 ∈ fi(E) ∩ F ) by Arrow's Axiom fi(F ) = fi(E) ∩ F and thus h1 ∈ fi(F ), contradicting our hypothesis. Hence it must be E ⊆ F so that, since h2 ∈ E, h2 ∈ F . Suppose that h2 ∈ fi(F ). Then h2 ∈ fi(F ) ∩ E and thus, by Arrow's Axiom, fi(E) = fi(F ) ∩ E; hence, since h1 ∈ fi(E), h1 ∈ fi(F ), contradicting our hypothesis. Hence h2 ∈ F \fi(F ).
Suppose that (h1, h2) ∈ R5. Then h1 is a prefix of h2 and thus, since h1 ∈ F , h2 ∈ F . If h2 ∈ fi(F ) then, by Assumption A1, h1 ∈ fi(F ), contradicting our hypothesis. Hence h2 ∈ F \fi(F ).
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) ⇒ (b) Let i be a total pre-order that rationalizes H, Ei, fi and satisfies Properties PL1 and PL2i. By Proposition 4, H, Ei, fi satisfies 20 Without Condition C it is possible that h2a ∈ Di and that
Arrow's Axiom and Assumption A1. We need to show that Assumptions A2 and A3 are also satisfied. Let h ∈ Di and F ∈ Ei and suppose that h ∈ fi(F ). We want to show that ha ∈ fi(F ) for some a ∈ A(h).
Hence h ∈ fi(E) and it will be enough to show that ha ∈ fi(E) for some a ∈ A(h). Since h ∈ fi(E) and, by hypothesis, fi(E) = {x ∈ E : x i y, ∀y ∈ E}, h i y, ∀y ∈ E.
By (1) of Property PL2i there exists an a ∈ A(h) such that ha i h. Thus, by (17) and transitivity of i, ha i y, ∀y ∈ E and thus ha ∈ fi(E). Thus Assumption A2 holds. To prove that Assumption A3 is satisfied, let h ∈ Di, a ∈ A(h) and F ∈ Ei be such that h, ha ∈ fi(F ). Fix an arbitrary h ∈ Ii(h) ∩ fi(F ). We need to show that h a ∈ fi(F ). Letting E = − → Ii (h), by the same argument used above we have that fi(E) = fi(F ) ∩ E, so that h, ha ∈ fi(E) and h ∈ Ii(h) ∩ fi(E) and it is thus sufficient to show that h a ∈ fi(E). Since ha ∈ fi(E) and, by hypothesis, fi(E) = {x ∈ E : x i y, ∀y ∈ E}, ha i h. Thus, by (2) of Property PL2i, h a i h . Since h ∈ fi(E), h i y, ∀y ∈ E. Thus, by transitivity of i, h a i y, ∀y ∈ E and therefore h a ∈ fi(E).
(b) ⇒ (a) Let H, E i, fi be a choice frame of player i that satisfies Arrow's Axiom and Assumptions A1-A3. Let R * be the relation defined in (10) . Then R * is transitive as well as reflexive (because R5 is reflexive -see Remark 2 -and R5 ⊆ R * ). Let i be a total pre-order that extends R * (see Definition 6 and Proposition 3). Since R5 ⊆ R * ⊆ i, i
satisfies Property PL1. Next we show that i satisfies Property PL2i. Fix an arbitrary h ∈ Di and let E = − → Ii (h) ∈ Ei. By definition of choice frame, fi(E) = ∅. Fix an arbitrary x0 ∈ fi(E) and let h0 ∈ Ii(h) be the prefix of x0 in Ii(h). Then, by Assumption A1, h0 ∈ fi(E). Thus, by Assumption A2, there exists an a ∈ A(h0) = A(h) such that h0a ∈ fi(E). Hence, by (5), (ha, h) ∈ R2 and therefore (since R2 is a subset of i) ha i h. Thus we have proved part (1) of Property PL2i. To prove part (2) of Property PL2i, fix an arbitrary h ∈ Di and an arbitrary a ∈ A(h) and suppose that ha i h. We have to show that h a i h for all h ∈ Ii(h). Since (h, ha) ∈ R5 ⊆ R * if (ha, h) / ∈ R * then, by definition of extension (see Definition 6) ha i h, contradicting our supposition. Thus (ha, h) ∈ R * . Hence, by Corollary 1, (ha, h) ∈ R2 and thus (see Remark 3) (h a, h ) ∈ R2, for all h ∈ Ii(h). Since R2 ⊆ R * ⊆ i, h a i h for all h ∈ Ii(h).
It remains to show that i rationalizes H, Ei, fi . Fix an arbitrary E ∈ Ei, h ∈ fi(E) and h ∈ E. Then (h, h ) ∈ R * . 21 Thus fi(E) ⊆ {h ∈ E : hR * h , ∀h ∈ E} so that, since R * is a subset of , fi(E) ⊆ {h ∈ E : h h , ∀h ∈ E}. Conversely, let h ∈ E be such that h h , ∀h ∈ E. We need to show that h ∈ fi(E). Fix an arbitrary h0 ∈ fi(E). Suppose that h / ∈ fi(E). Then, by Lemma 3, (h0, h) ∈ R * and (h, h0) / ∈ R * . Thus, since i is an extension of R * (see Definition 6), (h, h0) / ∈ i, contradicting our hypothesis 21 The argument is the same as in the first part of the proof of Lemma 3: if E = H then (h, ∅) ∈ R3 and (∅, h ) ∈ R5; if E = H then, (h, x0) ∈ R4, (x0, y0) ∈ R1 and (y0, h ) ∈ R5, where x0, y0 ∈ Di are such that E = − → Ii (x0), y0 ∈ Ii(x0), x0 is a prefix of h and y0 is a prefix of h . that h h , ∀h ∈ E.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let ∈ T i∈N
Pi. By Proposition 1, for every i ∈ N , every element of Pi satisfies Property PL1. Thus satisfies PL1. Now fix an arbitrary decision history h and let i be the player to whom it belongs. By Property PL2i of Proposition 1, ∃a ∈ A(h) such that ha h and, ∀a ∈ A(h), if ha h then h a h , ∀h ∈ Ii(h). Thus satisfies also Property PL2. Hence is a plausibility order.
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